Reply to PQs on Government’s Response to Academic Paper

Parliament Sitting: 6 October 2026

Mr Alex Yam Ziming: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Public Service has reviewed the findings of a recent study suggesting that, prior to 2011 to 2012, some public officers disproportionately purchased properties near future MRT stations before their locations were publicly announced; (b) whether the Government will independently examine or validate these findings; and (c) what actions will be taken in response.

Mr Alex Yam Ziming: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) what safeguards are currently in place to prevent and detect public officers from using non-public Government information for private financial gain, including through related persons; and (b) whether these safeguards are periodically reviewed for officers with access to market-sensitive information concerning infrastructure, land use and other Government decisions.

Ms Joan Pereira: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Public Service Division (PSD) has completed its review of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) paper regarding private property purchases by civil servants near unannounced MRT stations; (b) what initial findings or anomalies, if any, have been identified; and (c) whether further investigations and enforcement measures will be required. 

Mr Yip Hon Weng: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) how the effectiveness of safeguards against public officers using confidential MRT and land-use information for property purchases is assessed; (b) whether officers' property declarations are systematically cross-checked against their access to such information; and (c) what the considerations are for requiring prior transaction clearance in addition to property declarations. 

Ms Elysa Chen: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether public officers, contractors, consultants or other key personnel in and commissioned by agencies that plan rail and other infrastructure are subject to declaration or transaction rules that differ from those applying to the wider Public Service; and (b) if so, how do these differ.

Mr Azhar Othman: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance in light of recent reports of civil servants acquiring properties in or near areas earmarked for future development, where such development plans have not been made public (a) whether there is a regulatory framework to ensure that such actions are curbed; and (b) if so, what safeguards and enforcement measures are in place.

Assoc Prof Terence Ho: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance whether the Government assesses that there is a need to strengthen safeguards, including rules, penalties, preventive measures and detection or enforcement methods, to ensure that public officers do not use privileged information for material gain for themselves or their family members.

Mr Gerald Giam Yean Song: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether public officials’ purchasing property based on non-public land-use information constitutes a breach of statutory duties or civil service rules; (b) whether public officials’ asset declaration rules will be expanded to cover immediate family members and co-habitants; and (c) whether retrospective checks for anomalies will be conducted on past property transactions near unannounced infrastructure projects.

Ms Lee Hui Ying: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the review of the research paper that civil servants allegedly disproportionately bought homes near unannounced MRT stations has been completed; and (b) what safeguards are in place to govern the access to non-public information.

Ms He Ting Ru: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether civil servants are required to declare property purchases that may relate to non-public information on future transport infrastructure; and (b) how such declarations are cross-checked against officers' access to planning information. 

Ms Jessica Tan Soon Neo: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) what steps are being taken to review the recent working paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, a US-based non-profit organisation, on the alleged property purchases by civil servants near future MRT stations; and (b) how will the Government assess the validity of its claims and ensure safeguards over non-public planning information.

Dr Choo Pei Ling: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance regarding the working paper published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, a US-based non-profit organisation (a) what is the Government’s assessment of the methodology used linking Singapore Government Directory data with private property transaction records; and (b) what steps is the Government taking to maintain public trust in the integrity of the Civil Service. 

Miss Rachel Ong: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance whether there is evidence of an unusual increase in the disposal of private residential properties by civil servants and statutory board employees prior to the 30 September 2022 announcement of the 15-month wait-out period, particularly among officers or teams who may have had prior knowledge of the measure. 

Mr Fadli Fawzi: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) how the Public Service Division (PSD) currently monitors property purchases by civil servants and their immediate relatives; (b) whether PSD intends to strengthen controls over property purchases by civil servants involved in strategic planning and land use decisions; and (c) whether PSD will investigate property purchases by civil servants around other types of infrastructure such as new schools. 

Ms Gho Sze Kee: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance in light of the working paper by US-based National Bureau of Economic Research on public officers’ property purchases (a) whether the Government has assessed the ability to systematically link individual private-property transactions with publicly accessible information identifying public officers; and (b) whether additional safeguards are warranted where such linkage could reveal the property transactions of public officers, particularly those in sensitive positions.

Miss Rachel Ong: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance regarding Public Service Division's review of research alleging unusual property purchases by civil servants near yet-to-be-announced MRT stations (a) how it will ensure independence and avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest in determining whether there is a material basis for referral to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB); and (b) whether CPIB will independently assess whether this threshold is met. 

Miss Rachel Ong: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether current safeguards preventing public officers from using privileged information for personal or related-party gain remain effective against increasingly complex potential schemes for wrongdoing; and (b) how the Government plans to enhance these safeguards to further reduce such opportunities.

Miss Rachel Ong: To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance whether the Government has ascertained if the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), or the researchers behind the recently published study on public officials’ home purchases in Singapore, received any direct or indirect funding for this or related research from foreign governments, political organisations or other entities that may raise concerns about foreign influence or conflicts of interest. 

Oral Reply by Mr Chan Chun Sing, Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister-in-charge of the Public Service

Mr Speaker, Sir, may I have your permission to answer Parliamentary Questions 18 to 27 in today's Order Paper together?

My response will also address Parliamentary Question 2134 for written answer today, Parliamentary Questions 3161, 3176 and 3182 scheduled for 7 October, and Parliamentary Questions 3122, 3166, 3167 and 3179 scheduled for 8 October. If satisfied with the response, Dr Choo Pei Ling, Miss Rachel Ong, Mr Fadli Fawzi, and Ms Gho Sze Kee may wish to withdraw their questions for subsequent sittings.

NBER Working Paper and Government's Review

Mr Speaker, Sir, the Government set out our preliminary response to the NBER working paper in PSD's media release on 25 September. I will briefly recap the key points and update the House on our review.

The NBER working paper reported a statistical association between individuals whom the authors classified as civil servants working in agencies connected to rail planning, and property purchases near planned MRT stations before their locations were announced. The statistical association concerned announcements in or before 2011 and was not observed after 2011.

As we said earlier, this statistical association is a matter of concern and we take it seriously. But it does not, by itself, establish misconduct by any individual officer. There are also limitations to what we can independently establish about the paper's underlying data, including the source and representativeness of its proprietary dataset and how individuals in the different datasets were matched.

We have therefore carried out our own checks, using government records. While the NBER working paper identified the period of concern as between 2007 to 2011, PSD extended the review to 2014 as a matter of prudence, as many new MRT station locations continued to be announced in the years after 2011. Based on our administrative records, PSD identified officers who were in agencies involved in rail planning and who made property purchases between 2007 and 2014 that were close to locations subsequently announced as MRT stations. For each transaction, we examined the available records. This included the officer's role at that time, whether the officer had access to relevant non-public information, the timing and circumstances of the transaction, and other relevant information available to us.

Through this process, we reviewed property transactions made by 191 officers. Further checks are still ongoing. Based on the available information at this stage, we have identified 8 officers whose cases warrant further examination. This could be due to the specific circumstances surrounding the purchase, or that we currently do not have adequate information to exclude the cases from further review. We have referred these cases to the Police. Let me emphasise that a referral does not mean that wrongdoing has been established. The Police will look into the facts independently and due process will be followed.

Existing Rules and Safeguards

Members have also asked about the safeguards against misuse of non-public Government information. The fundamental principle is clear. Public officers must never use information obtained through their official duties to advance their own private interests or those of others.

This is set out in the Public Service Code of Conduct. Depending on the circumstances, unauthorised use or disclosure of official information may also constitute an offence under the law. There are several layers of safeguards.

First, access to sensitive information is controlled. Officers are given access on a need-to-know basis. Such information is subject to security classification and handling requirements, system and physical access controls and, where appropriate, audit, monitoring, and project-specific safeguards.

Second, there are declaration and approval requirements governing officers' personal interests and transactions. Since the 1990s, all officers have been required to declare purchases of private property and, annually, any non-owner-occupied properties they hold.

These requirements have been progressively tightened over the years. Today, where an officer possesses non-public information relevant to a transaction that he or she proposes to undertake, the officer must seek approval from the Head of Agency before proceeding. This is not confined to property transactions; it applies to other personal transactions where the officer possesses relevant non-public information.

These requirements also extend to transactions involving officers' spouses and financially dependent children. More broadly, an officer must not pass non-public information to a relative, friend or any other person for private gain. Doing so would breach the applicable rules and may also constitute an offence under the law, including the Official Secrets Act.

Third, agencies handling particularly sensitive information may put in place additional requirements according to the risks involved. For example, SLA had an additional requirement for officers in the relevant department to declare to HR any sale of property or land by themselves, their spouses or financially dependent children. This supplemented the existing requirement for all public officers to declare purchases of private property.

Agencies also have safeguards covering persons outside the Public Service who are given access to sensitive Government information. Contractors, consultants and other personnel are subject to appropriate confidentiality, conflict-of-interest and information-handling requirements. Agencies may also impose additional requirements on them depending on the nature and sensitivity of the work involved.

Fourth, there are channels to allow officers to report suspected wrongdoing to their supervisors, HR or Heads of Agencies. This provides an additional means of bringing possible misconduct to attention.

Whether the Safeguards Should Be Strengthened

Several members have asked whether we should go further – for example, through more systematic cross-checking, widen declaration requirements to other family members or cohabitants, or other measures.

The Public Service regularly reviews our rules and has strengthened them over time. We will consider what the present review tells us about their effectiveness and whether there are gaps to address. Any further measures should be proportionate to the risks and practical to implement, while allowing legitimate personal transactions to proceed with appropriate oversight.

Even with strong safeguards, no system can eliminate the possibility of wrongdoing entirely. We must therefore continue to reduce the opportunities for abuse, maintain effective means of detection, and act firmly where evidence of wrongdoing emerges.

Scope of Retrospective Checks

Members have also asked whether checks should extend to other infrastructure projects and property transactions, including schools or land-use decisions, as well as property disposals before the announcement of the 15-month wait-out period in September 2022.

We have not undertaken such a review at this point in time. The present exercise arose from specific assertions in the NBER working paper concerning rail planning and property purchases over a particular period, and our checks have therefore focused on those assertions.

Sir, we should not assume that officers with access to non-public information have misused it. However, where specific information gives reasonable grounds for concern in another context, we will look into it.

Investigation and Accountability

Miss Ong has asked how the Government will avoid actual or perceived conflicts of interest in deciding what matters arising from this review should be referred for further investigation.

PSD's present exercise is an administrative review to establish the relevant facts. PSD does not determine criminal culpability. Where the facts disclose grounds for concern, the matter will be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency, whether the Police or the CPIB, depending on the circumstances. The relevant law enforcement agencies will look into the matter independently and determine the appropriate course of action.

Publicly Available Information on Officers

Ms Gho has asked about the ability to link publicly available information about officers with information on property transactions, and whether additional safeguards are needed to protect officers' confidentiality.

There are different considerations involved. Certain information on property transactions and ownership is already publicly accessible for legitimate reasons. Separately, some information about civil servants' appointments and responsibilities also needs to be made available in the public domain.

We should not restrict access to such information simply because it may be linked across different sources. At the same time, the Government will continue to ensure that personal information about public officers which does not need to be made public is appropriately protected.

Funding of the NBER Research

Miss Ong also asked about the funding of the NBER research. We do not have information about its sources of funding. More fundamentally, our approach is to assess the substantive claims in the paper on their merits – by examining the methodology, the available evidence and, most importantly, the underlying facts.

Conclusion

Mr Speaker, Sir, the integrity of the Public Service and the public's trust in it are fundamental. We therefore take allegations of misuse of official information seriously. But we must also proceed on the basis of evidence and due process. This is why we have examined the actual officers, transactions and available records. Where the facts disclose grounds for concern, we will refer them to the appropriate authorities. Where wrongdoing is established, we will act firmly.

We will also learn from this episode. If the review or subsequent investigations reveal gaps in our safeguards, we will strengthen them. This is how we will continue to uphold the high standards of integrity expected of our Singapore Public Service, and maintain the trust Singaporeans place in us.